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Richard Milhous Nixon is one of the most central political figures in 
American history. Therefore, an analysis of how he rose to national 
prominence, and so quickly at that, is a worthwhile discussion. For example, 
Nixon entered the United States House of Representatives in 1946 by defeating 
the popular Democratic incumbent, Jerry Voorhis. Without previous political 
experience, Nixon was thrown into Congress where he was promptly placed on 
the infamous House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). There he 
gained national fame in the case of Alger Hiss, an accused communist spy. He 
followed this with a stunning victory in the 1950 senatorial race against Helen 
Gahagan Douglas. Soon after, Nixon was nominated as the vice presidential 
candidate in 1952. At the young age of forty, and just six years after his first 
political campaign, Nixon entered the White House as Dwight D. Eisenhower's 
vice president. Nixon's meteoric rise to power begs the question of just how 
exactly he accomplished this feat. The answer to this question is quite simple: 
Nixon used the issue of communist subversion to further his political career. In 
fact, the perceived communist threat of the post-World War II era was the chief 
catalyst in Nixon's rise to the forefront of American politics. His career gained 
momentum alongside the Red Scare of this era with his public battles against 
accused communist sympathizers. 
Following World War II, Americans became obsessed with the fears of 
communist subversion. The Cold War produced unstable relations with the 
Soviet Union and other pro-communist countries, which made for a frightening 
future. As a result, "Red-baiting," or discrediting those associated with 
communism, became a way of life for some politicians hoping to get noticed. 
This was obviously the focal point for men such as Joseph McCarthy, the most 
notorious Red-baiter of all. In this era, reputations were made or ruined as were 
careers. Certainly, Nixon's career was furthered, chiefly by the communist 
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issue. The reason for this lies in America's deep concern about communists, 
and the press that capitalized on those fears. 1 
The influence of the press cannot be overlooked in an assessment of 
Nixon's rise to fame by way of the communist issue. Journalists obviously 
understood that their publications sold when they discussed issues that truly 
concerned the population. The threat of communists in the government was 
one of those issues, and thus a favorite story for reporters. Therefore, a 
candidate in an election speaking to this threat or a congressman fighting the 
evils of communism were both given a great deal of attention, and many times 
favorably written about in papers and magazines across the United States. 
Nixon was one of these men to whom journalists paid attention; he was usually 
involved with an issue that made for a good, sensational story. A look at the 
influence of the press is important then, for it played a key role in Nixon's 
political ascendency, beginning with his first election. 
Nixon's entry into politics began in September 1945, when he received an 
offer to run for Congress on the Republican ticket the following election year. 
The offer came from Herman Perry, an influential banker in Whittier, California, 
and friend of the Nixon family. Nixon responded enthusiastically to Perry'~ offer 
even though he had never held a political office in his life. Shortly after the offer, 
Nixon heard that the nomination was to actually come from a Republican 
search committee in the election district of Whittier. This Committee of One 
Hundred was searching for a candidate that could defeat the popular 
Democratic congressional incumbent of the Twelfth District, Jerry Voorhis. 
Therefore, the nomination was not yet Nixon's, for the committee had to 
interview other candidates before a decision could be rendered. However, when 
Nixon interviewed with the committee's members, he made a favorable 
impression upon them. Nixon spoke the Republican credo of the committee 
when he essentially told them that he did not subscribe to the present 
government's liberal New Deal policies. Shortly after the interview, Nixon was 
informed that the nomination was his.2 
Nixon may have received the nomination, but his challenger in the election 
was a formidable one. Jerry Voorhis had faced no real challenges to his seat 
since his entry into Congress in 1937. Voorhis was greatly admired not only in 
the Twelfth District, but throughout the country. He was also truly respected by 
his opponents. For example, in 1946 he was dubbed the hardest working 
member of the House by his colleagues. Even the mainly Republican district of 
1 Richard M. Fried, Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective (New York: 
Oxford University, 1990), 3. 
2 Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1960 (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1987), 118, 120-1. 
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Whittier consistently elected this New Deal liberal. However, the postwar era 
witnessed a great deal of ideology changes around the nation. For example, the 
area of Southern California turned against government controls and a 
centralized bureaucracy, precisely what the New Deal represented. In this 
climate, Voorhis was somewhat vulnerable. Still, many political experts 
considered Nixon, pr any other Republican candidate, a lost cause against 
Voorhis in a congressional campaign.3 
Preceding the main campaign, both candidates received their respective 
party nominations, with Voorhis earning 53 percent of the total primary vote. 
This was a decent showing for Voorhis considering he had not yet begun 
campaigning. However, Nixon was busy planning how he could turn the 
campaign around in his favor. Indeed, he needed an issue that could grab the 
attention of voters. Nixon's future senatorial opponent, Helen Douglas, later 
claimed that Nixon had nothing to draw on in order to sufficiently debate 
Voorhis on the issues. Therefore, she argued, he had to wage a vicious 
campaign to get ahead. A vicious campaign was certainly what it turned into 
when Nixon claimed that Voorhis was endorsed by a communist organization. 
The organization was a branch of the local Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO) called the Political Action Committee (PAC). This was by far the most 
explosive issue in the campaign.4 
Shortly after the primaries, Nixon charged that the CIO-PAC openly 
endorsed Voorhis. Actually, the organization did not support Voorhis. Rather, 
the National Citizens Political Action Committee (NCPAC) did. Though this 
organization also contained communists, it was the non-communist liberals of 
the group that endorsed Voorhis. The NCPAC's communist members fought 
against this support because of Voorhis's condemnation of the Soviet Union's 
expansionist policies in Eastern Europe. In turn, Voorhis did not welcome the 
NCPAC's endorsement. Through all of this, Nixon understood that the CIO-PAC 
did not really support Voorhis. However, beginning at the infamous South 
Pasadena debate in September 1946, Nixon convinced the audience and many 
voters that the CIO-PAC endorsed his opponent.5 
Nixon and Voorhis debated at the South Pasadena Junior High School on 
September 13. The most significant part of the debate came towards the end 
when Voorhis denied, as he had before, an endorsement by the CIO-PAC. 
3 Kenneth Franklin Kurz, Nixon's Enemies (Los Angeles: Lowell House, 1998), 44, 
46; Paul Bullock, "Rabbits and Radicals, Richard Nixon's 1946 Campaign Against Jerry 
Voorhis," Southern California Quarterly 55 (Fall1973), 320. 
4 Bullock. "Rabbits and Radicals", 324-5; Helen Gahagan Douglas, A Full Life 
(New York: Doubleday, 1982), 244. 
5 Kurz. Nixon's Enemies, 48. 
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Unfortunately, Voorhis demanded proof of the endorsement from his opponent. 
At that moment, Nixon confidently burst across the stage, handed Voorhis a 
paper, and stated that it proved the charges were correct. Though the paper 
only (correctly} proclaimed that he was endorsed by the NCPAC, Voorhis was 
visibly shaken. He tried to point out that the endorsement was from a PAC 
different than the CIO-PAC, but Nixon rebutted with the statement that the two 
organizations were virtually the same thing. Voorhis was not heard the rest of 
the evening over Nixon's accusations and boos from the audience. The 
damage had been done, as Voorhis's campaign continued to follow a 
downward spiral leading up to the general election.6 
Close to election day, Nixon intensified his attacks as he Red-baited 
Voorhis. For example, the Nixon campaign ran an advertisement in local 
newspapers charging that, among other things, Voorhis was a registered 
Socialist and his voting record in Congress was more communistic than 
Democratic. In the last weeks of the campaign, Nixon came across as a warrior 
fighting the "Red tide." He told audiences that communist sympathizers were 
gaining positions in the government, which proved that there was a conspiracy 
to overthrow the present government in favor of a communist one. These 
charges helped to pull in more votes for Nixon as the election neared.7 
On election day, Nixon prevailed in a big way, winning by a margin of 
15,000 votes. Nixon was sent to the House with 56 percent of the vote, 
following in the foot steps of many other Republicans. Indeed, the Republican 
party enjoyed a large margin of victory in 1946, as they gained a majority in 
Congress. In the prevailing atmosphere of change, the Democratic party 
suffered a great loss. However, this does not take away from Nixon's 
overwhelming victory. Nonetheless, it is still debated by historians as to whether 
or not the communist issue played the decisive role in Nixon's victory, or if 
Voorhis's defeat can simply be attributed to the these other Republican 
victories. It is argued by some scholars that Americans did not even understand 
the issue of communism in 1946. In fact, it is often cited by historians that 
Nixon, years later in his memoirs, wrote that communism was not the central 
issue of the campaign. Nixon claimed that the PAC issue only provided 
emotional excitement, not motivation for voters. Even a Time magazine article 
from 1946 mentioned that Nixon plugged issues dealing with such topics as 
veterans' housing, but did not personally attack his opponent.8 
6 Jonathan Aitken, Nixon: A Life (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1993), 126-7. 
7 Kurz. Nixon's Enemies, 49. 
8 Kurz. Nixon's Enemies, 52; Richard Milhous Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon 
(New York: Gressett & Dunlap, 1978), 41; "New Faces in the House," Time, 18 
November 1946, 26. 
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Though these arguments may seem convincing, a close assessment of the 
race proves that communism was the main issue in the campaign. It was the 
difference between victory and defeat. As noted before, Voorhis was an 
extremely popular incumbent. Even in the climate of discord following the war, 
prominent Republicans still believed that Voorhis was unbeatable, and that 
Nixon running against him was simply a gamble. However, following the 
Pasadena debate, Voorhis found himself on the defensive as he had never 
been in his previous campaigns. He not only had to defend himself against an 
issue that he had never dealt with, but one that grabbed the attention of 
thousands of Americans following the war. Even Voorhis wrote years later that 
the tricky way in which Nixon discredited his voting record with the PAC issue, 
and related it to communism worked very well in 1946. In fact, Voorhis almost 
mocked Nixon's claim that the communist issue was not central to the 
campaign. It seems Voorhis himself realized that the frustrations that followed 
from working to deny the serious issue of endorsements from communist 
organizations, and a voting record sympathetic to communists, was too much. 
The PAC issue worked extremely well for many reasons. One reason was 
because Americans actually did fear communism in 1946. A poll taken in that 
year found that 52 percent of Americans believed communists should be 
exposed at whatever cost, even if that meant executing them. It is obvious that 
there was in fact a concern about communist subversion at the time of the 
election. Another reason this tool worked so well was due in large part to the 
press.9 
Nixon was strongly supported by most of the newspapers in the 1946 
election. Early on, the press realized what an explosive issue anything 
connected to the Soviet Union and communism could be. An example of this is 
seen in the October 3 issue of the Monrovia News-Post, a California paper that 
carried a story about Voorhis entitled, "Pro-Russian Votes Alleged." The article 
stated that it was now in doubt as to whether or not Voorhis was pro-Russian. It 
claimed that Voorhis was sympathetic to Russia because of the revelation that 
he voted for left-wing programs six times. These votes were seemingly not 
remotely related to the issue of communism, but the paper grabbed the 
attention of Americans by claiming that Voorhis was suddenly an enemy of the 
United States. The same things happened in other newspapers, including the 
prestigious Los Angeles Times, which heavily supported Nixon. This is 
significant because the Times dominated the Twelfth District with its campaign 
9 Ambrose. Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1960, 125; Jerry Voorhis, The 
Strange Case of Richard Mifhous Nixon (New York: PaulS. Eriksson, 1972), 10, 12; 
American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1935-1971 (New 
York: Random House, 1972), 587, 594. 
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coverage. More importantly, Kyle Palmer, a political reporter for the paper, 
picked Nixon out early on as a man with potential for winning campaigns. 
Accordingly, Palmer enjoyed accusing Voorhis of being a Socialist while 
praising Nixon. Obviously, Voorhis suffered from a lack of positive coverage 
from this large newspaper. In fact, even when he tried to set his record straight, 
the Times and other Southern California newspapers did not print his story. 
Voorhis's daily schedules and rally announcements were also not usually 
printed in the biased papers. On the other hand, these same papers, especially 
the Times, printed the stories that made Nixon look good while ignoring those 
that might tarnish his reputation. Due to these circumstances, Nixon prevailed 
in the election and took off for Washington, where the communist issue 
changed his life forever. 10 
Nixon was sworn into the Eightieth Congress in January 1947, just a year 
away from the case that would give further life to his career. Nixon was 
appointed to HUAC, the House committee notorious for its investigations of 
alleged communists in the government. HUAC presided over the infamous 
1948 Hiss case that pitted a former communist, Whittaker Chambers, against 
Alger Hiss who was accused of being a communist spy. In the center of the 
drama was Congressman Nixon. It was the Hiss case that truly started him on 
the road to fame. 
The affair began in July 1948, when Elizabeth Bentley, called "The Red Spy 
Queen," testified before HUAC. She accused several government officials of 
being communist agents. This seemed shocking enough, but HUAC had no 
proof that Bentley was correct. Nixon began his role in the case by persuading 
Robert Stripling, HUAC's chief investigator, to find a witness that could 
corroborate Bentley's accusations. That witness turned out to be the senior 
editor of Time magazine, Whittaker Chambers.11 
The affair intensified when Chambers took the stand a month later, and 
proceeded to corroborate Bentley's charges. Then, Chambers added another 
name to the list of supposed communists. That name was Alger Hiss, a former 
Department of State official. The charge seemed positively ridiculous. When a 
suave and handsome Hiss took the stand two days later to deny the charges, 
HUAC was persuaded to drop the case. Most of the committee seemed 
pleased with Hiss's flat denial of never being a communist. Nixon was not 
convinced, however. 
1° Frank Mankiewicz, Perfectly Clear: Nixon from Whittier to Watergate (New York: 
Quadrangle Books, 1973), 44; David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 256-8. 
11 Aitken. Nixon: A Life, 150. 
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Nixon told the story that Hiss's behavior seemed too suspicious. He felt Hiss 
went overboard in his role as the innocent man wrongly accused. He believed 
Hiss's performance was too good, and therefore not a convincing denial. When 
HUAC met to discuss ending the investigation, Nixon took the lead in arguing 
his point. He claimed that Hiss denied ever knowing anyone by the name of 
Chambers. However, he felt that it was quite possible Hiss may have known 
Chambers, only by a different name. Nixon said if Hiss was not truthful about 
this, he also may have lied about not being a communist. These arguments 
were obviously quite convincing, for years later in his book Witness, Chambers 
wrote that congressmen rallied around Nixon as he "became the man of 
decision of the first phase of the Hiss case." Thus, HUAC decided to continue 
an investigation into a possible relation between Chambers and Hiss. From that 
point on, Nixon became Hiss's "unofficial prosecutor."12 
The investigation and prosecution was launched a few days later. First, 
Chambers was interviewed by Nixon's subcommittee. Chambers revealed that 
he knew a great deal of personal information about Hiss during the meeting. 
Then, on August 17, Nixon told Stripling to summon both Chambers and Hiss 
before the subcommittee. The confrontation took place in New York City at the 
Commodore Hotel. The most striking part of the confrontation was when Hiss 
asked Chambers if he had ever gone by the name of George Crosley, to which 
Chambers denied in a strangely cocky manner with a smile on his face. 
Following this revealing meeting, Nixon determined that somehow Chambers 
and Hiss knew each other. The next day, the front page of the New York Times 
read, "Alger Hiss Admits Knowing Chambers." The story provided details of the 
Commodore meeting, but more importantly, it referred to Nixon a great deal 
throughout the article. It definitely left the reader with the feeling that Nixon was 
taking care of the now escalating case. Also of significance, to the left of this 
article read the headline "Anglican Bishops Fear Communism as a World Peril." 
It cited that the Bishops considered the menace of communism to Christianity to 
be their biggest concern. Certainly, this only added to Nixon's role as America's 
chief investigator of communists. The public was, undoubtedly, now 
enthralled.13 
The American audience was further excited by the Hiss case when on 
August 25, a public hearing of HUAC was broadcast on national television. It 
12 Nixon. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 55; Whittaker Chambers, Witness (South 
Bend, Ind.: Regnery/Gateway, 1952), 557; Alger Hiss, Recollections of a Life (New 
York: Seaver/Henry Holt, 1988), 203. 
13 Ambrose. Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1960, 182; C.P. Trussell, 
"Alger Hiss Admits Knowing Chambers; Meet Face to Face," New York Times, 18 
August 1948, 1. 
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was the first major congressional hearing to be televised, and undoubtedly 
damaged Hiss's reputation. Nixon and other members of HUAC succeeded in 
building a strong case against Hiss as they grilled him for five hours. Magazines 
and newspaper articles swarmed with the word that Stripling, and especially 
Nixon, questioned Hiss most sharply, including a Time article which provided 
readers with Nixon's questions and Hiss's testimony. The drama was in full 
force. 14 
The affair heated up further with the revelation of the "pumpkin papers." In 
December 1948, Chambers produced evidence that seemingly connected Hiss 
to the underground communist movement. Chambers led HUAC investigators 
to a pumpkin patch where he pulled out five roles of film from a hollowed-out 
pumpkin. The film turned out to be copies of confidential State Department 
documents concerning trade agreements important to the Soviet Union back in 
the thirties. Three of these summaries were believed to be in Hiss's 
handwriting. With this film, the case turned into the biggest and most 
sensational espionage case in the history of the United States. At the center of 
it all was Nixon, and many Americans realized this. After Hiss was indicted on 
two counts of perjury on December 15, 1948, Nixon's role in the case ended. 
However, the affair continued to affect Nixon's life in a dramatic way. 15 
The Hiss case positively transformed Nixon's career. He emerged from the 
event a national hero, especially in the eyes of the Republican party. His new 
reputation as the congressional communist warrior catapulted him into the 
Senate and the vice presidency. Nixon had a tool to employ in his following 
campaigns after the Hiss case. He was always able to remind voters of his 
major role in convicting a perceived communist. In the wake of the two 
momentous events in 1949: the Soviet Union's explosion of their own atom 
bomb, and Mao Tse-tung's communist victory in China, Americans became 
quite worried about communist subversion. Therefore, after a respected 
government insider such as Hiss was found to be a possible communist, Nixon 
appeared to many to be a godsend. Of course, Nixon used his new-found 
notoriety to his advantage. For example, he delivered many speeches following 
the case that reiterated his important role in the affair. Most notable was his 
January 26, 1950, speech to the House on this topic. In this speech, Nixon 
reminded his colleagues of the ways in which he kept the investigation on 
course. At the same time, he charged the Truman Administration with failure to 
rid the government of communists. The speech gained a great deal of attention, 
14 Kurz. Nixon's Enemies, 79-80; "Burden of Proof," Time, 6 September 1948, 17. 
15 Aitken. Nixon: A Life, 170-1. 
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for it reminded Americans what a crucial role Nixon played in the battle against 
communism.16 
One example of the attention Nixon garnered following the case is seen in a 
Wichita, Kansas, "Prayer Circle Letter'' sent out to subscribers by Reverend 
Gerald B. Winrod. This evangelist led a national movement to alert Americans 
of threats to their: values, including communism. The particular letter in 
examination said that in searching for a piece of literature that covered the 
entire problem of communist subversion, Congressman Nixon's great speech 
dealing with communists in the government was selected. The letter announced 
that it would send copies of the important speech to those concerned about the 
issue. Obviously, Nixon's role in the case furthered his career with this sort of 
attention. The press helped a good deal in this regard as well. 17 
Nixon proved to be quite helpful in relating information of the case to 
journalists. In fact, he was one of the most outspoken members of HUAC. This 
is important to note, for reporters were themselves capitalizing upon the case. 
The hysteria that accompanied the Hiss case made it popular to report on the 
young Californian chasing a "dangerous" communist. One of the reporters that 
understood this was Bert Andrews, the bureau chief of the New York Herald 
Tribune. He liked stories that were exciting and dramatic. Therefore, he enjoyed 
the stories that were coming out of HUAC in 1948. Significantly, Andrews 
developed a close relationship with Nixon and proceeded to legitimize him with 
his fellow reporters. As a result, Nixon cultivated a very positive relationship 
with the press. These good relations were crucial to furthering Nixon's career. 
Voorhis, Nixon's former congressional opponent, came straight to the point 
when he wrote that the Hiss case for Nixon was "a publicity gold mine which 
was to stand him in good stead for years to come." One such group that paid 
attention to this notoriety was a coalition of California Republicans, which urged 
Nixon to run for the Senate in the upcoming 1950 election.18 
16 1bid., 150; United States House of Representatives, The Hiss Case--A Lesson for 
the American People, speech prepared by Richard Milhous Nixon, 81st Cong., 2d 
sess., 1950; Robert K. Carr, The House Committee on Un-American Activities 1945-
1950 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1952), 234-5. 
17 Gerald B. Winrod, "Prayer Circle Letter, 1950," p. 4, Special Collections, Ablah 
Library, Wichita State University, Wichita, Ks. 
18 Voorhis. Strange Case of Richard Milhous Nixon, 12-13; Theodore H. White, 
Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon (New York: Atheneum, 1975), 67-68; 
Halberstam. The Powers That Be, 259-61; "Fighting Quaker," Time, 25 August 1952, 
15. 
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The senatorial race between Nixon and Helen Gahagan Douglas made use 
of red smear tacti~s never seen before or after. The campaign witnessed Red-
baiting at every twist and turn by both candidates. However, a look at the tactics 
in the race demonstrates that Nixon used the issue of communist subversion 
much more effectively than Douglas, and therefore not only entered the Senate 
after four years in politics, but gained the vice presidential nomination shortly 
thereafter. 
The issue of communism was used even before the main campaign 
commenced. Strangely enough, Nixon did not even begin the Red-baiting. That 
was left to Los Angeles Daily News editor, Manchester Boddy, the Democratic 
candidate in the 1950 primary. Prior to Boddy's entry into the race, he had 
favorably covered Douglas's political career for five years. 19 
However, close to the primaries, Boddy dubbed Douglas the "Pink Lady," a 
tag that epitomized the whole campaign. Boddy and his followers decided to 
link Douglas with the socialist congressman, Vito Marcantonio, whose voting 
record led many to believe he was a communist sympathizer. This was 
accomplished by selling the story that Douglas had voted in the House along 
the same lines as this left-wing New Yorker. Therefore, she could be 
considered a socialist herself, or worse, a communist. Years later Nixon wrote 
that the most damaging accusation for Douglas came before the Democratic 
primary, when the incumbent, Senator Sheridan Downey, publicly stated that 
Douglas voted against aid to Greece and Turkey. This was seen as a risky vote 
since these were countries that could possibly fall into communist hands. In 
reality, the accusations that Douglas and Marcantonio were voting together 
were a large misrepresentation given that a good deal of the matching votes 
had been along party lines. Indeed, Marcantonio was voting the same as most 
of the Democrats in the House. That did not stop Boddy from claiming that 
Douglas was a communist sympathizer. However, the accusations also did not 
prevent Douglas from losing the primary. Her wide margin of victory set her up 
to face Nixon, as he easily gained his party's nomination as well.20 
Though Douglas won the primary, many of her supporters worried about the 
communist label Boddy had pinned on her. Newsweek reported that Douglas's 
backers feared that Boddy's pro-communist attacks on her would end up 
helping Nixon in the election. In the United States, there was anxiety about 
19 Ingrid Winther Scobie, "Douglas v Nixon: A Campaign on the Conscience," 
History Today 42 (November 1992), 19. 
2° Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Proceedings 
Against Gerhart Eisler, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 93, pt. 1 (18 
February 1947): 1129-30; Nixon. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 74; Scobie. "Douglas v 
Nixon: A Campaign on the Conscience," 20. 
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McCarthy's Red-baiting as he smeared hundreds of alleged communists. More 
importantly, in late June the North Korean communists invaded South Korea. 
Certainly, Nixon realized that he had to turn these public anxieties stemming 
from the new developments into his own political gain. The Korean War surely 
simplified Nixon's job.21 
When the campaign kicked off following the primaries, Nixon began to use 
the "soft on communism" slogans. Nixon was actually told by some of his 
campaign strategists not to employ the communist issue so heavily in light of 
McCarthy's overboard attacks. Nixon insisted that he must use the issue, 
though, because he found that he received the strongest response from 
audiences when he discussed the Hiss case. Keeping true to this statement, 
early on in the campaign Nixon suggested that Douglas voted against efforts to 
support the Korean War effort. To counter these charges, Douglas went on the 
attack. She accused Nixon of voting against an aid package for South Korea. 
She claimed the vote proved Nixon did not understand the communist threat in 
the Far East. She went so far as to say that Nixon possibly influenced the 
decision of the communists to invade Korea.22 
The Nixon camp effectively responded to Douglas's charges by going on 
the offensive, a tactic that proved to be important to Nixon's victory. The Nixon 
camp claimed Douglas, herself, had voted against actions to thwart 
communism, such as voting against military aid to Greece and Turkey. They 
even charged that she voted against appropriations for HUAC. On all of these 
occasions, they said, she voted with Congressman Marcantonio, the perceived 
communist party-liner. They claimed Douglas voted with Marcantonio 353 
times. Then, in an innocent but calculating tone, they asked how Douglas could 
accuse others of communist leanings when 'she had so deservedly earned the 
title of the Pink Lady?' Through all of this, the Nixon camp was ecstatic about 
Douglas's earlier charges, for they realized she was attacking Nixon's 
strengths. Was he not the man who made the Hiss case possible, they asked. 
Certainly, Nixon realized this, for as Newsweek reported, he constantly invoked 
the Hiss case in his foreign speeches about communist conspiracies and 
appeasement. The article noted that Nixon's most consistent applause getter 
came when he demanded that the State Department be cleaned out for its 
21 
"California Foot Race," Newsweek, 5 June 1950, 27; Scobie. "Douglas v Nixon: A 
CamJ>aign on the Conscience," 20. 
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failure to combat communism. Obviously, Nixon knew how to use his 
prominence from the Hiss case.23 
The accusations continued to heat up, and the Red-baiting escalated as the 
election approached. Even name-calling entered the race, with Nixon referring 
to Douglas as the Pink Lady and accusing her of being "pink down to her 
underwear." At the same time, Douglas called Nixon "Tricky Dick," a label that 
stuck with him throughout his career. Both candidates searched everywhere for 
anything they could use to link their opponent to communism. However, while 
Douglas delivered long and boring speeches denying communist leanings, 
Nixon stayed on the offensive and worked on manipulating her voting record. 
Certainly, turning her record into one sympathetic to communists went a long 
way in convincing the voters of Douglas's inability to serve in the Senate. As if 
this was not bad enough, the most devastating tactic was yet to come. 
Douglas most likely brought on the Nixon camp tactic that turned the 
campaign around. It began when the Douglas campaign distributed a yellow 
leaflet, which will be referred to here as the "yellow sheet." This leaflet told 
voters to examine Nixon's voting record and in so doing, "pick the 
Congressman the Kremlin loves!" It went on to say that Nixon's votes could 
actually be compared to those of Marcantonio's. The Nixon camp simply turned 
around and praised the yellow sheet. They viewed it as a fatal mistake on the 
part of Douglas because once again, she was attacking Nixon's strengths. 
Nixon easily and convincingly defended his position. The front page of the Los 
Angeles Times, among other papers, reported Nixon as saying that the yellow 
sheet terribly distorted his voting record and meant to confuse the public. He 
continued with the accusation that this merely concealed the fact that Douglas 
actually voted over 350 times with Marcantonio since they had served in 
Congress together.24 
The yellow sheet not only sent Nixon on the offensive again, but prompted 
him to distribute a leaflet of his own, which made a huge impact on voters 
throughout California. That leaflet became known as the "pink sheet." It 
accused Douglas of voting with Marcantonio just as Nixon had done previously. 
The difference was that these accusations were printed on pink paper, an 
obvious reference to the successful Pink Lady issue. It was an excellent 
technique that proved quite effective. The bright leaflet easily reached 
thousands of voters who possibly missed the other smears. Nixon later wrote 
23 Mitchell. Tricky Dick and the Pink Lady, 80; Scobie. "Douglas v Nixon: A 
Campaign on the Conscience," 21; "Roaring Races," Newsweek, 30 October 1950, 21. 
24 Aitken. Nixon: A Life, 186-7; Nixon. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 77; "Vote 
Record Falsified, Nixon Says: Senate Candidate Accuses Opponent on 'Big Lie' Issue," 
Los Angeles Times, 3 November 1950, sec. 2, 1. 
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that one of the worst mistakes made by Douglas was the distribution of the 
yellow sheet claiming that his voting record was more pro-communist, because 
it only brought on the pink sheet. Even Douglas attested to this fact when she 
wrote, years later, that the pink leaflet was by far the most damaging tactic used 
against her. She went on to say that the pink sheet only turned leading 
Democrats against tler, citing that they could no longer support her due to her 
voting record. Rather, they proceeded to gather support in California from 
Democrats who would vote for Nixon. More helpful to Nixon, though, was 
Douglas's response to the leaflet. Instead of returning an attack on Nixon, 
Douglas presented her very long, rather laborious voting record. This obviously 
did not stand up to Nixon's tactics, especially in a climate of fear and 
uncertainty stemming from the Cold War.25 
In the end, Nixon defeated Douglas in a large way. She was defeated by a 
margin of 59 percent to 40 percent. This was, in fact, the largest majority 
achieved by any candidate running for the Senate in 1950. This is not surprising 
when one considers the time period. As Douglas later wrote, a congressman 
that chased spies and traitors in an atmosphere of atomic bombs and 
communist victories "could quickly be seen as a savior." Of course, in the 
context of the Cold War the press was once again extremely active, and 
consequently helpful to Nixon.26 
Nixon discussed nothing but communism in 1950, and therefore he received 
a huge amount of support from the majors newspaper in California. These 
papers were out to capitalize on the frightening climate as well. Papers in Los 
Angeles and San Francisco often reported twice daily on how Douglas could be 
connected to communism. More importantly, the Los Angeles Times once 
again played a crucial role, for the paper was especially built around reporting 
on dangerous foreign influences, such as communism. Thus, this paper was 
extremely harsh on Douglas and certainly made no effort to print stories that 
portrayed her in a positive light. Douglas could have been on to something 
when she later wrote in her autobiography about a study conducted, years later, 
at Stanford dealing with press coverage of the campaign. She claims the study 
found that 70 percent of the unfavorable statements about her were reported, 
whereas only 30 percent were reported about Nixon. Accordingly, Nixon was 
sent to the Senate in 1950, but he did not stay there for long. Soon afterwards, 
he received the offer to serve as Eisenhower's vice presidential candidate.26 
25 Kurz. Nixon's Enemies, 117; Nixon. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 76; 
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Nixon's selection as the vice presidential candidate in 1952 is not that 
surprising when ~ne considers the time period in which Nixon lived. In the first 
couple of years of the 1950s, developments in the world proved to be ideal for 
Nixon's career. These developments included the Americans' defeat in North 
Korea by the communists, Hiss imprisoned for perjury, and McCarthy's vicious 
attacks on suspected communists. All of this presented the perfect opportunity 
for Nixon. The young politician was the Republican party's key speaker. Also, 
he was extremely successful in terms of fund raising for his party. Anywhere he 
went, he had the proper credentials to blast the Democrats for their failure to 
curb communist problems. The combination of his record of bringing supposed 
communists out into the open, and the atmosphere of the 1950s, meant Nixon 
was able to capture a great deal of attention. Therefore, when the Eisenhower 
camp selected Nixon as the vice presidential candidate, not too many could 
have been shocked. 27 
It was obvious from the start that Eisenhower, and most of the Republican 
party were impressed with Nixon's credentials. A well-known story concerns 
Eisenhower telling Nixon, in May 1951, that he was impressed Nixon "not only 
got Hiss," but that he "got him fairly." Nixon continued to impress the 
Republicans when in June, he delivered a speech to the National Young 
Republican Convention in Boston. As always, Nixon stressed the Truman 
Administration's failure to combat communism and reminded his audience that 
the Republicans had no fear of finding communist skeletons in their own 
closets. Next, Nixon spoke at a Republican fund raiser at the Waldorf-Astoria in 
New York City. Nixon felt that this speech helped him to be selected as the vice 
presidential candidate. Following the speech, New York Governor Thomas E. 
Dewey suggested that the Republicans consider Nixon for the vice presidential 
candidacy. Another man the Republicans considered for their vice presidential 
candidate, however, was William F. Knowland, California's other senator at this 
time. Knowland was very similar to Nixon in that they were both young and had 
congressional experience. He was missing the reputation of a communist 
warrior, though. This was important, for as an article in Time magazine put it, 
the two primary issues in the 1952 presidential race were communism and 
corruption in government. Therefore, Nixon was perfect, as he even wrote in his 
memoirs that his "anticommunist credentials from the Hiss case were what most 
27 Mankiewicz. Perfectly Clear: Nixon from Whittier to Watergate, 52-55; 
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79 
tilted the decision" to him. Eisenhower understood these credentials, and as a 
result Nixon was chosen as the vice presidential nominee.28 
Obviously, Nixon's selection as the vice presidential candidate served an 
important purpose for the Republicans. While Eisenhower's role was that of the 
father figure staying above the fray, Nixon's job was, as a U. S. News and 
World Report article wrote, to do the rough political fighting and pick at the 
Democrats' failure to combat communism. Nixon gladly did this, and did it well. 
His record made him an expert on the issue. The New York Times captured this 
when it wrote that Nixon understood his role in the campaign as the political 
hatchet-man for the Republicans.29 
Nixon began his hatchet work with accusatory remarks aimed at the 1952 
Democratic presidential candidate, Adlai Stevenson. Nixon cast doubts on 
Stevenson's loyalty to the United States, with shocking and downright cruel 
remarks. Nixon, along with McCarthy, served as Eisenhower's troops bent on 
shocking the public with accusations that the Democrats were cowards in the 
face of communism. One infamous example of this was Nixon's attack on Dean 
Acheson, Truman's secretary of state. Nixon later wrote that he caught the 
attention of the voters when he told them about the "Dean Acheson Community 
College of Communist Containment." Nixon continued with charges that the 
United States was losing in Korea because of the Truman Administration 
policies. All of this was a great asset for the Republicans, as no one could claim 
Nixon or his associates had anything to do with the communist problems. 
Indeed, this was the man who prosecuted a communist and revealed a 
congresswoman to be a possible communist sympathizer. Despite these 
credentials, Nixon came close to being scratched from the ticket when the 
"slush fund" crisis surfaced.30 
The issue arose on September 18, 1952, when the New York Post carried 
the headline, "Secret Nixon Fund." It went on to report that a slush fund "keeps 
Nixon in style far beyond his salary." Nixon's campaign managers, and Nixon 
himself believed nothing would come of the story since it was considered to be 
a legal and ethical fund by most politicians. In fact, funds of this sort were kept 
by countless other politicians. They were simply war chests set up to cover 
political costs, and the money was supposedly not used for personal reasons. 
28 Nixon. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 88; Jeff Broadwater, Eisenhower and 
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Even an article in the New York Times noted that one hundred other 
representatives also had a fund of this sort. It said that these congressman 
used these funds to fight the evil powers in Washington. However, as the 
Democrats were taking a beating from the communist warrior in Nixon, any 
possible controversial issue they could find on their opponent had to be used. 
Therefore, the Democrats attacked Nixon ferociously. Some newspapers even 
demanded Nixon resign from the ticket. With all the buzz, Eisenhower became 
uncertain about his running-mate. In fact, most of Eisenhower's campaign 
managers began looking for the right time to dump Nixon from the ticket. 
However, they and most everyone else had temporarily forgotten about Nixon's 
brilliant use of the communist issue, which had already gotten him so far in his 
career.31 
Nixon dealt with the crisis right from the start by reminding voters of his 
communist warrior background. For example, at a campaign whistle-stop in 
Marysville, California, Nixon told an audience that he worked on investigating 
communist subversion, and therefore ever since he began that line of work, the 
leftists had been trying to smear him in return. He went on to say that he 
intended to continue to expose the communists the more they smeared him. 
This defense one again struck a chord with Nixon's audience, and therefore 
played a role in saving his candidacy at the beginning of the crisis. However, it 
was the "Checkers" speech that truly saved his career.32 
Nixon was well aware of the fact that he needed to win back the support of 
voters if he wanted to remain on the ticket. The fund crisis broadcast, popularly 
known as the "Checkers" speech, did just that and more. The Republican 
National Committee paid a handsome sum of money for a thirty minute 
nationwide television broadcast in order for Nixon to air his side of the story. In 
the famous September 23 speech, Nixon often made references to his record, 
such as a referral to his role in the Hiss case. He also discussed his family's 
dog, for which the speech was named, that was a gift he admitted should have 
been returned. Nixon almost tearfully stated that this gift could not be taken 
away from his daughters. This statement showed Nixon's softer side. Nixon 
then went on to once again discuss his fight against communism. Finally, 
toward the end of the speech, Nixon told the audience that he loved the United 
States, but felt it was in danger. Therefore, Eisenhower was the man to elect in 
31 Ambrose. Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1960, 276-77; "Gwinn Says 
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order to save America. In the final emotional seconds, the television screen 
went blank. The verdict was left to the public.33 
The public was enthusiastic about Nixon's speech. A Newsweek article 
focused on the part of Nixon's speech in which he claimed that the fund had 
gone to defray the expenses of his battle against communism. The following 
line read that the public reaction was tumultuous. Indeed it was, for the 
Republican National Committee received over 160,000 telegrams and 250,000 
letters that supported Nixon 350 to 1. The most important vote, though, came 
from Eisenhower. The general could not turn his back on Nixon now, as he had 
proved that he was still more popular than ever. Certainly, this was due in large 
measure to his prominence stemming from the Hiss case and his previous 
elections. Even Nixon wrote in his memoirs that the further prominence he 
gained after the fund speech revived interest in the Hiss case. Therefore, even 
something like a fund crisis allowed Nixon and Eisenhower to emphasize the 
communist subversion issue. Voorhis wrote that following the fund speech, 
Nixon claimed communists were smearing him with regards to the fund. 
Therefore, Voorhis argued, who would dare to question Nixon? Obviously, 
Nixon was kept on the ticket.34 
On election day, Eisenhower won the presidency by a landslide, garnering 
thirty-four million votes to Stevenson's twenty-seven million. Nixon became the 
second youngest vice president in United States history, turning forty years of 
age following his inauguration in January 1953. Nixon's meteoric rise in 
American politics can only be compared to John F. Kennedy's ascendency to 
the presidency in 1961 at age forty-three. This fast rise to the top can be 
attributed to the time period Nixon lived in. The decades in which he gained 
political fame provided an intense issue for him to focus on. His election to the 
vice presidency in 1952, and again in 1956, witnessed Nixon's polished Red-
baiting. His use of the communist issue was his key to political ascendency. 
Once again though, the press also played a crucial role.35 
The press understood more than ever how explosive the issue of 
communism was in the 1950s. One of the more influential men regarding press 
coverage of communist subversion was Henry Luce, the publisher of Time and 
Life magazines. He worked a great deal on the promotion of national anti-
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importantly, it said that Nixon was "the most convincing and successful product 
of them all." Indeed he was.38 
38 Who is Richard Nixon," New Republic, 8 September 1952, 9-10. 
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